To begin, Tadros proposes and explains a rationale that centers around who ought to hold responsibility in society. He heavily looks to his example of the poor of any society as a prime candidate for those who ought not be responsible for situations like theft or other criminal acts because they, themselves, have not been raised and developed in what we would consider rational society. Tadros lists a host of reasons why this should be the case that we should employ, but he also lists the contrary. I liked this aspect of the reading in that he demonstrated flaws in his own proposition. This shows that his views are malleable, and that counters exist. His logic seemed to be quite rooted and significant throughout the whole piece, but his open stance showed that discussion is worthy and valuable, which I think every aspect of today’s society needs a bit more of. As the excerpt continued, Tadros identified two primary classes of consequence that mirror the separation of responsibility based on class: hypocrisy and complicity. Tadros then goes to piece together many examples and counterexamples that show how these facets work and work against the common good of responsibility for society. Hypocrisy, as Tadros writes, could look like one criminal upholding critical standards for other criminals of an equal or lesser caliber. His example is of a rapist demeaning a thief or a reckless driver, it doesn’t make much sense because rape or murder is a much more serious crime, by modern standards. Complicity, the more complex of the two, initially is described as someone responsible for enabling the active agent of the crime. Like giving a hitman advice on how to kill the target, or by simply employing a hitman to kill someone. Complicity is a lot more difficult to prove, in this right, because the level of involvement another person had on a particular crime committed is difficult to diffuse. Tadros goes on to write about more counterexamples of form, including the relational portion of complicit actions. Nearer to the end, Tadros wraps his argument back around to his original, further discussing the responsibility that poor people have when presented with criminal intent. The conclusion, after all points given, demonstrates a respect for the arguments present and takes a rather split, compromised approach to an answer: sometimes, those with little status may be entitled to lesser social responsibilities than those who were brought up under fairer, more level circumstances.
